A betweenness axiom states that if A and B are equally good then a mixture of A and B is equally good as well. This note demonstrates that the violations of the betweenness axiom documented in several experimental studies can be alternatively attributed to the effect of random errors. 
Introduction
In choice under risk (e.g., Knight, 1921 ) a betweenness axiom states that if an individual is indifferent between two lotteries than a probability mixture of these two lotteries is equally good (e.g., Dekel, 1986) . Apart from its normative appeal, betweenness axiom is attractive because it is compatible with the Allais paradox (e.g., Chew, 1983) and it is sufficient for proving the existence of Nash equilibrium (e.g., Crawford, 1990 ). This note reexamines the experimental methodology of several studies conducted in the late 1980's and early 1990's to test the descriptive validity of betweenness axiom. A casual survey of this literature suggests that betweenness is not a descriptive axiom. However, when this empirical evidence is thoroughly examined, a more favorable picture emerges.
The literature on stochastic utility (e.g., Loomes and Sugden, 1998) reached a generic conclusion that some behavioral patterns, which appear as a systematic violation of a certain principle when taken at a face value, may actually support the principle once a stochastic specification is allowed. The present note demonstrates that this generic conclusion also applies to the case of betweenness. Section 2 reviews the alleged systematic violations of betweenness as documented in the existing experimental literature. In section 3, this evidence is reconciled with a stochastic version of betweenness i.e. when an individual obeys betweenness with an occasional random error. Section 4 concludes.
Experimental evidence on betweenness
This section briefly summarizes ten well-known experimental studies conducted in the late 1980's and early 1990's that document an alleged systematic violation of betweenness.
Coombs and Huang (1976) (experiment 1), Chew and Waller (1986) , Camerer (1989) , Battalio et al. (1990) , Gigliotti and Sopher (1993) (experiments 1 and 3) and Camerer and Ho (1994) all find that, on average, 68% of subjects respect betweenness. The remaining subjects are split between quasiconvex (i.e. they dislike randomization) and quasiconcave (i.e. they like randomization) preferences approximately in a non-corresponding proportion of 24% to 8%.
This alleged systematic violation of betweenness emerges when some lotteries used in the experiment are located on the edges of the probability triangle (e.g., Machina, 1982 ).
Coombs and Huang (1976) (experiment 2), Camerer (1992), Starmer (1992) and Gigliotti and Sopher (1993) (experiment 2) find that, on average, 76% of subjects respect betweenness and a split between quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences is non-systematic (approximately in a non-corresponding proportion of 14% to 10%) when all of the lotteries used in the experiment are located inside the probability triangle. Additionally, Camerer and Ho (1994) find that the asymmetry of alleged betweenness violations disappears and Bernasconi (1994) finds that the number of betweenness violations decreases (though not their asymmetry) when a probability mixture of two lotteries is presented in a compound rather than a reduced form.
Finally, Prelec (1990) finds that 76% of subjects reveal quasiconcave preferences and only 24% of subjects respect betweenness when probability mass of the hypothetical lotteries is largely shifted to the worst outcome. Camerer and Ho (1994) replicate this result for one lottery triple "TUV" in the experiment with real payoffs. Bernasconi (1994) documents a similar strong asymmetric violation of betweenness in two lottery pairs (1 and 3), where a modal choice pattern is inconsistent with betweenness.
To sum up, the experimental studies frequently document an asymmetric split between quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences. However, a modal choice is inconsistent with betweenness only in few lottery pairs. Such empirical evidence has been accepted initially as a strong support for frequent violations of betweenness (e.g., Camerer, 1992) . Section 3 shows that this experimental evidence is actually consistent with stochastic betweenness theories.
Noteworthy, the concept of stochastic utility was formalized only in the mid 1990's i.e. after the wave of experimental tests of betweenness.
A reexamination of experimental methodology
All experimental studies mentioned in section 2 employ the same method to test for betweenness violations. An experimenter determines two lotteries 1 L and 2 L and asks an individual to choose one lottery from three sets:
, where
Earlier studies typically consider only the first and the second pairwise choices. If a probability mixture M is frequently (almost never) chosen in the second and third pairwise choices this is interpreted as an evidence of quasiconcave (quasiconvex) preferences.
Harless and Camerer (1994), Hey and Orme (1994) and Loomes and Sugden (1995) propose different ways of incorporating a stochastic element into deterministic decision theories.
The following argument is built upon a more general stochastic specification that is consistent with the stochastic specifications of Hey and Orme (1994) and Loomes and Sugden (1995) but not with Harless and Camerer (1994) . Harless and Camerer (1994) p. 1261 propose a constant choice-independent error rate. Loomes and Sugden (1998) find that this stochastic specification generally fits the data poorly. Hey and Orme (1994, p.1301) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999) propose an additive, normally distributed error term on the utility scale. Loomes and Sugden (1995) argue that random errors directly affect a preference relation of an individual rather than an individual's utility of lotteries. A stochastic betweenness axiom implies relation (1) where * stands for 
, which appears as if the evidence of quasiconcave 
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. In terms of the approach of Loomes and Sugden (1995) , an individual's preference
, which in its turn is stronger than the preference
, the above experimental procedure reveals that an individual apparently respects betweenness with probability 65%, apparently has quasiconvex preferences with probability 24% and apparently has concave preferences with probability 8%.
However, it is misleading to interpret these results as a systematic violation of betweenness. Camerer and Ho (1994) p.176 find a similar asymmetric split between quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences and conclude that "betweenness is clearly violated". However, when Camerer and Ho fit different stochastic theories to the same dataset, a disappointment aversion theory (e.g., Gul, 1991) , which is a betweenness theory, accommodates data better than cumulative prospect theory, which violates betweenness (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992 ). If an asymmetric split between quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences is caused by random errors, the observed violations of betweenness are likely to be more symmetric for mixtures with α close to 0.5 and they are likely to be highly asymmetric with α close to 0 or 1.
This prediction is confirmed by experimental evidence. A highly asymmetric split between quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences reported in Prelec (1990) 
Conclusions
A reexamination of experimental methodology used in the studies allegedly documenting systematic violations of betweenness demonstrates that the existing evidence is consistent with a stochastic betweenness i.e. the individuals appear to obey betweenness with random errors. On its own, the asymmetric split between quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences is not a sufficient evidence of violations of stochastic betweenness unless quasiconvex or quasiconcave preferences are revealed as a modal choice. The later case, however, is documented rarely in the experimental studies. The asymmetric split between quasiconvex and quasiconcave preferences can be generated by random errors whose impact is less severe for lotteries that are more distinct in terms of an individual's utility. This result explains an apparent puzzle mentioned by Camerer and Ho (1994) why a stochastic betweenness theory (disappointment aversion theory) fits best in 5 out of 11 experimental studies and outperforms the cumulative prospect theory although its main building block-a deterministic betweenness axiom-is apparently violated.
